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Poland 
Krystyna Iglicka, Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz and Agnieszka Weinar 
 




There has not yet been a single and comprehensive debate on the policy on the entry and 
residence of foreign nationals in Poland.  Instead, there have been several debates in 
various fora, dealing with different aspects of the debate.  The EU accession process has 
been the main driving force behind policy development.  Although immigration to Poland is 
increasing, the debate continues to be either couched in technical issues associated with 
transposing EU legislation or it is seen as part of broader, disparate policies (such as 
employment).   
 
In the first half of the 1990s, Poland’s policies on managing migration flows concentrated on 
the issues of entry, covering four basic areas: (1) establishing border controls on all frontiers, 
(2) entry into the pan-European system of controlling transit migration (entering into 
readmission agreements with the Schengen and neighbouring states), (3) constructing a 
rudimentary legal and institutional asylum framework, and (4) facilitating cross-border traffic 
with the neighbours (maintaining non-visa regimes with all European states, including the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)). Those four areas could be placed within a 
broader context of two complementary, though at times conflicting, discourses that emerged 
at the time, border control and human rights, leading to the polarisation of the emerging 
stakeholders in the process.  
 
Border control has been guided by concepts of security, both in national and international 
dimensions, and the Ministry of Interior and the Border Guards have drawn support for 
restrictive legal measures both from recurring domestic concerns1 and from the experience of 
co-operation with partners from the EU, especially Germany.2  Although asylum matters were 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, the Border Guards have played an important role 
in the implementation of asylum procedures.   
 
However, as indicated above, the security agenda has been mediated (and softened) 
through the increasing presence of non-governmental organisations.  An office for the 
representative of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was 
established in Poland as a result of the country’s accession to the 1951 Geneva Convention.  
The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights has also become active, involving itself in legal 
proceedings in the courts, including the Supreme Administrative Court, where they have held 
                                                 
1 According to the polls, 41 per cent of respondents favoured restrictions to the current rules of entry, that is, more 
thorough controls on travellers’ supplementary documentation (in particular letters of invitation from Polish 
nationals), 42 per cent opted for the introduction of visa requirements for the citizens of the former USSR, and 71 
per cent declared that the imposition of entry visas for them would improve security.  The majority of the Polish 
respondents (73 per cent) viewed labour migration to Poland in a negative way due to:  increased competition on 
the labour market (lower salaries and / or higher unemployment), currency outflow, non-payment of taxes and 
breaches of order and public security.  (Based on the polls of 4-6 November 1994 in Warsaw, Kiepsko ich 
tolerujemy (We treat them badly), Gazeta Wyborcza, 9.11.1994, in: S. Łodziński, Migracje zagraniczne w Polsce 
– rozmiary, struktura, problemy prawne i społeczne (International migration in Poland – scope, structure, legal 
and social problems), p. 35.  
2 On 29 March 1991, Poland signed an agreement on visa-free movement with the Schengen countries, which 
granted the right of free entry for tourist purposes to the citizens of both parties to the agreement.  On 7 May 
1993, Poland and Germany concluded an agreement on cooperation in combatting the effects of migratory 
movements.  The agreement stated that Poland should receive those third-country asylum-seekers who had 
arrived in Germany illegally from the territory of Poland (Poland was declared to be a "safe third country"). Poland 
also signed agreements of this kind with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine in the 
spring and summer of 1993. Similar agreements were concluded between Poland and all the neighbouring states, 
except Belarus and the Russian Federation, and a few others. 
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Ministry officials accountable for their decisions.  The other avenue used to mediate the 
security agenda has been through visa policy, the responsibility for which was originally 
outside the Interior Ministry’s scope, resting instead with the Foreign Ministry (tourist and 
transit visas) or territorial administration (work and residence permits).   
 
The issues of visa-free entry for the nationals of all neighbouring states, and tolerance for the 
unregistered economic activities of most travellers officially declaring ‘tourism’ as reason for 
entry, have been upheld by all sides of government, leading to the formation of a durable 
inter-party consensus, which has survived shifts in governing coalitions and changing 
appointments of the heads of Polish diplomacy.  
 
EU accession as the external catalyst for legislative change 
 
The EU accession process has provided perhaps the most direct incentive for legislative 
change in recent years.  However, this process has not taken place without challenges.  
Indeed, the negotiation process revealed both the extent of the challenge to sketch a ‘road 
map’ towards the effective implementation of EU laws in the very recent national context and 
the gap between the expectations of the Commission and the Member States on the one 
hand and of the Polish government agencies and social partners on the other.  Within the 
negotiations in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), Poland resolved to implement the 
JHA acquis in full, including the Schengen acquis, by the time of accession without asking for 
any transition periods or derogations.3  Specifically, Poland accepted in full the acquis in the 
sub-areas of 'migration, admission and readmission', 'customs co-operation' as well as in 
'asylum' and 'combating terrorism', where legislative and institutional work was still in 
progress. The Schengen acquis was formally incorporated into the Polish law prior to EU 
accession, but failed to finalise the full implementation, which is now not expected to be 
complete until 2007.  This is largely because Poland is awaiting a positive assessment of the 
state of border infrastructure and operational capacity of all the institutions involved.  The 
Schengen Action Plan, adopted during the accession negotiations (and regularly updated 
during this period), outlines the steps taken to attain Poland’s integration into the Schengen 
system. The text is available at: www.mswia.gov.pl/pdf/sap.pdf  
 
The most important area of disagreement in the negotiations related to the visa policy for CIS 
neighbours, where Poland opted for the gradual introduction of a visa requirement to be in 
force prior to the date of accession.  The government made an initial commitment to comply 
with the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 11 January 2000 on the adjustment of the 
state visa policy to EU standards by the end of 2002.  However, in light of expected serious 
socio-economic consequences of the introduction of visas for the citizens of three 
neighbouring states, the government announced a change to the schedule which would defer 
the move as long as possible, leaving the issue of the residents of Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine to be tackled last.  The Polish stance differed significantly from that of its southern 
neighbours, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which had already imposed more restrictive 
regimes in 2000.  The disagreement over the visa issue reflected a significant difference in 
the manner in which the EU and its Member States on the one hand, and Poland on the 
other, viewed the question of travel for the Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians across the 
future external border.  One problem was that Polish legislation lacked the concept of ‘third-
country nationals’, referring instead to all persons who were not Polish citizens as aliens, and 
the conditions for entry of foreigners had been differentiated on the grounds of foreign policy 
and regulated by bilateral agreements.  
 
Even more crucial to the future position of Poland within the EU debate on managing 
migration was the profound gap in the manner in which the national agencies and the 
                                                 
3 Poland's negotiation position in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the 
Republic of Poland, 5 October 1999, p. 1 (www.negocjacje.gov.pl/neg/stne/sten24en.pdf) 
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European Commission viewed the development of the JHA acquis.  The initial Polish 
negotiation position assumed that Poland would only have to introduce the acquis as it 
existed on 1 May 1999 by the expected date of accession (1 January 2003).  However, the 
EU highlighted additional obligations, which included the changes to the JHA acquis 
following the Amsterdam Treaty and subsequent developments of the EU legislation.4  
Poland significantly underestimated both the length of the negotiations and scope of the 
obligations involved in the accession process.  Officials had expected the negotiations of the 
chapter to be a relatively quick and technical exercise, consisting of incorporating the acquis 
article by article.5  However, hopes for completing the harmonisation of the national 
legislation to the acquis in a short time proved unrealistic.  Early adjustments to the modest, 
initial EU legal framework presented at the outset of the negotiations soon led to additional 
changes.  In fact the framework for harmonisation evolved continuously throughout the 
process as it was forced to adapt and incorporate newer instruments that were tabled later in 
the negotiation process – instruments that were still being adopted by the EU15 members.  
Poland was the last of the ten candidates to close the negotiations in this area, provisionally, 
on 30 July 2002, only to conclude them finally only at the Copenhagen Summit on 13 
December 2002.6  
 
Put simply, the EU imposed on Poland the obligation to incorporate not only the letter but 
also the substance of the acquis so as to ensure working co-operation with the administrative 
systems and operational services of the Member States in Justice and Home Affairs.  The 
government was obliged to adopt all the international JHA conventions, which would have 
been ratified by EU Member States by the time of accession.  The EU made it clear that any 
international agreements, which were incompatible with the membership obligations, should 
be terminated.  The latter stipulation was particularly relevant for Poland in the case of visa-
free travel arrangements with its eastern neighbours.  The government was asked to provide 
the timetable for the termination of the visa-free agreements with its neighbours, and the 
effectiveness of the Polish consular services in controlling immigration from third countries 
was to be closely monitored.     
 
Further amendments to the Aliens Law and other national acts in the JHA realm were 
deemed to be necessary to ensure the prevention of illegal immigration, especially for 
employment purposes, and to align the admission of third-country students and family 
reunification with EU practice.  Legal solutions, training and improved co-ordination between 
border guards were essential for the effective control of the future external EU border.  These 
conditions included systematic controls of all persons crossing the border and effective 
surveillance of the border between authorised crossing points.7  Polish legislation was also 
expected to comply with the EU acquis on the general format of visas and with Common 
Consular Instruction, outlining a unified formal procedure for administering Schengen-format 
visas.  Legislative changes were also needed to incorporate elements of a working asylum 
system through the implementation of the 1990 Dublin Convention, which outlined an 
accelerated procedure of dealing with manifestly unfounded applications, the conclusion of 
readmission agreements with major countries of origin, and measures to be taken towards 
applicants who have failed to present their applications within a certain time frame.  Co-
ordination between institutions responsible for implementation was essential, and throughout 
the process, the EU monitored the progress of the creation of a single Polish Office for Aliens 
and Refugees.  The annual reports of the European Commission for 1999 and 2000 on the 
                                                 
4 European Union Common Position, Brussels, 24 May 2000, Conference on Accession to the European Union, 
CONF-PL 28/00. 
5 Interviews on the perception of accession negotiations in the JHA area were held by the Institute of Public 
Affairs at the end of 2003 at Departments of International Cooperation of Ministries of Interior and of Justice as 
well as at the Office of Repatriation and Aliens. 
6 All the dates in the negotiation process can be found on the site: http://www.negocjacje.gov.pl 
7 Poland was advised to concentrate its efforts in strengthening border controls on the frontier with the Russian 
Federation, Belarus and Ukraine as well as at airports, seaports and on the maritime borders.   
 3
progress of Poland on the path to EU membership reaffirmed its recommendation to seal the 
national borders and tighten the regulations on the entry of third-country nationals.  
 
Strong pressure from the EU to adopt specific solutions throughout the accession process 
enhanced the technocratic nature of legislative and institutional changes and placed the 
Ministry of Interior in the driver’s seat.  It is important to recognise that the work on the new 
law on aliens, which replaced the (then current) 1963 bill, was a product of the Ministry, 
working with the Commission, and without any real involvement of the Parliament.  A 
government proposal prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the administration was 
discussed, but no other proposals were tabled.  The legislative work was carried out by 
experts and committee members (between November 1995 to June 1997), and there were 
no major points of contention among the party parliamentary clubs or between the 
Parliament and the government  in the first reading.8  Indeed, members of Parliament, 
including representatives from all political factions praised the proposal without suggesting 
alternative solutions.  Throughout the plenary debate, the prospective obligations of EU 
membership were acknowledged and found to be consistent with the security needs not only 
of the Union as a whole but also of the Polish state.9  The policy learning aspect was also 
appreciated, as the bill was considered to open the way for new solutions, to the adaptation 
of the law to Poland’s new political, economic and social reality and to the European 
standards.  
 
Further amendments to the Act on Aliens (three bills were passed: in 1997, 2001 and 2003) 
were due in the process of harmonising Polish legislation to the acquis communautaire.  As 
the prospect of Polish accession to the EU became clearer, the harmonisation of Polish law 
with the acquis became a guiding objective for most of the amendments.  Since the EU 
allowed no derogations in the negotiation area of Justice and Home Affairs, and Poland 
concurred, questioning specific clauses of the acquis would only mean a delay in the 
country's EU membership.  The “Rationale for the Amendment” outlined by the Ministry of 
Interior referred to the obligations which Poland had adopted in the course of accession 
negotiations that were spelled out in the “National Programme for the Membership in the 
European Union” and the “Polish Negotiation Position in the Field of Justice and Home 
Affairs”.  The Ministry’s proposals were included in the wake of the consultations with the 
Union, which resulted in the closer approximation of the Polish legislation to the acquis 
communautaire.  Some of the new measures included the introduction of the institution of 
temporary protection, a provision for a “fast track” in case of evidently unsubstantiated cases 
of refugee applications, and the correction of judiciary procedures in case of detained 
foreigners. The most weighty consequence, however, was the establishment of a 
coordinating government agency to manage activities in the field of migration and residence 
of foreigners in Poland, titled the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners (www.uric.gov.pl).   
 
The European Commission, the main actor of the accession negotiations, thus became an 
engine of change in the Polish law on aliens.   
 
Domestic dimension of the debate in pre-accession period 
 
In the pre-accession period, discourse on the national migration policy failed to stir a broad 
political or media debate.  Indeed, the status of foreigners in Poland was the object of few 
controversies, which meant that domestic issues did not have a major impact on the debate.  
Instead, as outlined above, amendments focused on accession requirements.  
 
                                                 
8 Act on Aliens, 1st reading, 65th session, 3rd day, 24 November 1995, Sejm of the 2nd term. 
9 State security was the objective of the amendment, which made issue of the settlement permit conditional upon 
consultation with the Office of State Protection (Art. 82 in the final version of the law). 
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While relatively insignificant, some domestic concerns were raised in the course of the 
parliamentary debate, generating some lines of contention.  On the one hand, access to the 
territory was to be extended to groups to which Poland had owed the debt of either explicit 
legal obligation (asylum seekers) or bond of ethnicity (the diaspora).  The Helsinki 
Foundation for Human Rights and the Office of the UNHCR criticised the state for having a 
potential conflict of interest in these areas, considering the higher standards that Poland had 
adopted by acceding to the 1951 Geneva Convention and the European Convention on 
Human Rights.10  UNHCR found the first comprehensive bill on aliens (passed in 1997) to 
draw an insufficiently clear distinction between foreigners in general on the one hand, and 
refugees and asylum seekers as a group in need of particular protection, on the other.11  The 
Polish Community, the influential association concerned with the Polish diaspora affairs, 
stressed in turn the need for laying down the principles of repatriation, the procedure for 
acquiring Polish citizenship and the rights granted on the basis of national origin.12  In the 
course of the second reading of the bill, the human rights theme was further developed and 
new clauses on repatriation were introduced.  In essence, the second reading moved the 
debate toward social issues thanks to the involvement of non-governmental and international 
organisations.13 
 
Although amendments relating to labour immigration were not introduced, the link between 
the high national unemployment rate and the anxiety over rising illegal immigration did 
appear in the debate.  The law did regulate the legitimate ways for foreign employment in 
Poland; however, the members of parliament saw the bill primarily in terms of combating 
illegal immigration and illegal employment.  The proposal was therefore considered welcome 
for domestic reasons, as it was seen as providing an opportunity for protecting the Polish 
labour market from “being flooded by illegal labour”.  At the same time, the representatives of 
the liberal Freedom Union party came up with a proposal not to treat all employment 
categories equally.  Preferential clauses for potential investors were justified in their view in 
terms of Poland’s long-term economic interests.  The requirement to renew a work permit 
annually was also seen to run contrary to the country's economic interest. 
 
The passage of the new Act on Aliens of 26 June 1997,14 which introduced more restrictive 
rules for the entry and residence of foreigners in the country, employed several mechanisms 
to combat illegal immigration and put an end to the presence of unwanted aliens.  These 
measures were adopted along the lines of the acquis and the practices of most EU states.  
Its implementation spurred the debate on one of the key categories of foreigners entering 
Poland: the shuttle traders in the eastern borderlands of the country.  Importantly, this 
category hardly featured in the parliamentary debate at this time, as the impact of stricter 
conditions for the entry into Poland for personal or tourist purposes for less than three 
months for citizens of states without visa requirement was recognised only later.15  The set of 
                                                 
10 A. Rutkiewicz, I. Rzeplińska, Opinia dotycząca ustawy o cudzoziemcach (Opinion on the Act on Aliens), expert 
opinion commissioned by the Parliamentary Office of Studies and Expert Opinions, November 1995, E – 64. 
11 While UNHCR conceded that Poland had the right to control migration, it found the bill deficient in terms of 
guarantees of a full, fair and effective procedure for granting the status, and upholding the appeal mechanisms for 
de facto refugees and stateless persons.  They were also critical of the absence of the right to family reunification, 
in: Comments of the UNHCR on the Bill Proposal of the Act on Aliens), November 1995, UNHCR Liaison Office, 
Warsaw, p. 1. 
12 Minutes of the Session of the Parliamentary Committee of Administration and Internal Affairs of 6 May 1997, 
no. 152. 
13 Act on Aliens, 2nd reading, 108th session, 1st day, 4 June 1997, Sejm of the 2nd term. 
14 The law went into force on 27 December 1997. 
15 According to the executive regulations of the Ministry of Interior, the personal invitations and other documents, 
such as those confirming the transport reservations and accommodation, representing the basis for entry for, inter 
alia, the citizens of the former USSR on the basis of the Polish-Soviet agreement of 1979, would have to be 
officially certified at a notary’s office. Moreover, travellers were required to present a minimum amount of per diem 
funds, sufficient to cover the cost of travel, residence and departure. The Border Guards’ competence was 
extended to include the verification of the proper registration of the invitations and possession of the required 
amount of funds. 
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innocent technical measures, transposed from the EU practice, turned out to have a 
depressing effect on the volume of cross-border ‘open-air market’ trade in the first half of 
1998, which was compounded by the Russian financial crisis.16  Criticism of this policy was 
voiced in an extensive press debate, which for the first time raised the issue of broader 
socio-economic effects of introducing the EU regulations in the borderlands.17  The 
Parliament took note of the larger debate and several Members of Parliament (especially 
those representing the eastern borderlands of Poland) went on to criticise the government for 
the hasty and uncoordinated introduction of new requirements without implementing a proper 
information campaign to target cross-border traders. 
 
The follow-up to the passage of the Aliens Law of 1997 thus had a series of important 
consequences for the shape of policy-making process.  The Ministry of Interior learned that 
any changes in the procedures of the CIS travellers’ access to the Polish territory had 
ramifications far beyond the technical matter of EU harmonisation.  The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs proved to be an important institution for assessing the impact on bilateral relations 
and the Ministry of Economy needed to be consulted on economic consequences.  The 
government as a whole recognised that visa policy modifications needed to go through 
extensive inter-ministerial consultations and that the matters would have to be settled at the 
level of the Council of Ministers.  Criticisms about the lack of information on policy details 
available to relevant social partners and target stakeholders were also acknowledged.  As a 
result, Parliamentary committees became more open to independent expertise.  At the same 
time they also commissioned an increasing number of internal studies on the topics of 
foreigners, migration and minorities.18 
 
The political debate at the turn of 2000-2001 developed along the lines of the conceptual 
categories established between 1995-1997, while highlighting several broader socio-
economic concerns.  The legislative work on the amendments to the law on aliens, which 
began in 2000, was therefore carried out in a different political environment and the debate 
had to focus on other issues accordingly.  The Ministry of Interior’s EU-driven approach 
prevailed.  The necessity of adjusting the Polish legislation to the Union acquis eliminated 
any serious controversy.19 
 
The discourse on security was softened in the debate on the state policy in the field during 
the amendments in 2001-2003 by incorporating the category of human rights, which was 
raised mainly in the context of refugees and legitimisation of aliens’ stay in Poland.  The 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and UNHCR have paid particular attention to the 
                                                 
16 In the wake of the financial turmoil in Southeast Asia, the Russian rouble was sharply devalued and a climate of 
uncertainty about all emerging markets, including those of Central and Eastern Europe set in, leading to 
temporary destabilization of stock and currency markets of the region. 
17 Key articles from the press debate were collected in a study by the Parliamentary Office for Studies and 
Expertises of the Lower House of the Polish Parliament: Dyskusja prasowa na temat skutków wejścia w życie 
nowej ustawy o cudzoziemcach, grudzień 1997-maj 1998 (Press debate on the consequences of entry into force 
of the new Act on Aliens, December 1997-May 1998, S. Łodziński, Materials and Documents No. 247. July 1998. 
18 Cf. the studies by S. Łodziński of the Parliamentary Office for Studies and Expertises in the Sejm (Lower House 
of Polish Parliament), Problems of the Polish migration policy in 1989-1998 and the new Law on Aliens, Report 
No. 147 (July 1998) [http://biurose.sejm.gov.pl/teksty/r-147.htm]; Polish residents' opinions and attitudes towards 
migration and foreigners in light of public opinion, January 2002 (in Polish);  Protection of persons belonging to 
national and ethnic minorities – a European perspective, September 2002 (in Polish). 
19 It is interesting to note that the government commissioned the Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) to prepare an 
analytical study for the sitting of the Senate Committee for Foreign Relations and European Integration on the 
subject “Poland and the other applicant countries vis-à-vis the Schengen acquis obligations”K. Iglicka, Trendy w 
migracjach do Polski po 1989 roku w świetle rozszerzenia Unii Europejskiej (Trends in migrations into Poland 
since 1989 in view of the enlargement of the European Union), in: Polska droga do Schengen, Opinie ekspertów, 
ISP, Warszawa 2001. 
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issues of refugees’ rights and family reunification.  Amendments, such as the temporary 
protection option, came three years after the policy was initially implemented.20  
 
The immediate prospect of EU accession on the one hand made the government proposals 
easily defensible, but on the other forced a re-think of security issues in terms of the security 
of the community – a broader concern, which went beyond national security.   
 
The second reading of the draft amendment held in 2001 revealed the first objections from 
political parties.  The then opposition MPs – from the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) were critical about what they called a missing concept and 
political will to develop a comprehensive migration policy for Poland. Significantly, in the 
course of the debate, several other domestic issues crystallised, pointing to the directions of 
a broader socio-economic debate on migration in Poland as a new EU member state: 
- Repatriation – described by both the government and MPs as the long-awaited return of 
compatriots to their mother country.  Participants in this debate did not treat repatriates as 
aliens. 
- Protection of national interest – in the form of protecting borders, society and the country 
against the negative consequences of migration with a reservation that the proposals 
should not make the entry into Poland more difficult for legitimate visitors and immigrants.  
- Unemployment – illegal migration – the representatives of the Ministry of Interior and MPs 
have acted on the assumption that the protection of the national labour market should limit 
the access of foreigners to the market.  Such proposals were raised mainly in case of the 
unqualified workers (“the influx of cheap labour”). 
- Legitimate income-motivated immigration – covering a broad white-collar segment 
(including artists, entrepreneurs, corporate managers and athletes) was seen as beneficial 
to the country’s economy as an important source of new skills and accorded high social 
status. However, there were no practical measures to attract these desirable immigrants.  
Essentially, the discourse failed to cover the issues of labour migration. 
 
The extension of the national debate on the eve of accession to broader issues resulted in 
the identification of several categories of foreigners in Poland:  
1) Refugees – treated as a group of foreigners under particular protection, who enjoy the 
rights specified in the Geneva Convention and the New York Protocol, both ratified by 
Poland. 
2) Repatriates – considered not so much as foreigners (although they were foreigners in 
formal terms), but as persons to whom the Polish state bears a special responsibility, evident 
in the push to facilitate their return to Poland and their re-integration into Polish society.  
However, such objectives could only be partially met, due to the dire condition of public 
finances. 
3) Illegal immigrants – The state administration is of the opinion that illegal immigration 
should be combated effectively, not only at the border but also inside Poland (hence, 
extended powers of the Border Guards to control the legality of residence). Some non-
governmental organisations and state institutions (such as the Ombudsman) have called for 
a regularisation of foreigners who have resided in Poland for a significant period of time and 
have established permanent links to the country. 
4) Economic migrants – The presence of highly-qualified migrants and potential investors is 
viewed favourably in Poland, however this debate has been limited to assertions rather than 
                                                 
20 I. Rzeplińska, H. Rubinstein, E. Zienkiewicz, Opinia o ustawie o zmianie ustawy o cudzoziemcach oraz o 
zmianie niektórych innych ustaw, odnosząca się do projektu ustawy z 23.03.2000 (Opinion on the Bill on the 
Amendment to the Act on Aliens and on the Amendments to Some Other Acts), Zespół Pomocy Prawnej 
Helsińskiej Fundacji Praw Człowieka, 24.05.2000 r.  
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substantive measures.  Economic migrants are required to possess a work permit, however, 
there are some exceptions. The authorities have declared their intention to combat illegal 
employment, but in reality, the ‘informal economy’ is quite widespread.  What is more, there 
is significant public acceptance of the ‘informal economy’ in certain areas, such as care given 
to children and the elderly, construction, agriculture. 
 
Although the last major amendment of the Aliens Act prior to accession, which was passed in 
June 2003,21 was regarded primarily as part of the harmonisation process with the acquis, 
the parliamentary debate reinforced the domestic issues and categories of foreigners, 
present in earlier deliberations.  Three groups of foreigners were identified as being in need 
of specific policy measures prior to accession: spouses of foreigners, students and 
unaccompanied minors.  The first two groups’ rights have been heavily promoted by social 
actors, mainly the Helsinki Foundation and the Ombudsman.  Their arguments favour long-
term residence for these groups.  Apart from the usual human rights arguments, they spoke 
about the idea of integration – people who studied in Poland or who have family ties make 
better immigrants.  Unaccompanied minor legislation was introduced to Polish law on advice 
from the UNHCR, who had lobbied for the measure on humanitarian grounds.22 
 
The government also took opportunity to address the burning issue of irregular migrants 
through a (somewhat limited) regularisation.  The first regularisation was implemented with 
the explicit objective of settling the status of those foreigners who had already demonstrated 
the existence of de facto ties with the country, but who had not established ongoing legal 
residence in Poland.  The regularisation campaign was also aimed giving migrants from the 
CIS region an opportunity to adjust their status in light of the new requirements.  
 
The regularisation campaign lasted from 1 September to 31 December 2003.  All foreigners, 
who had lived continuously in Poland for at least six years, and could prove housing and 
financial means to cover necessary expenses, or a work promise (or contact), were entitled 
to apply for a one-year temporary residence permit, regardless of their status, which would 
enable them to enter a regular procedure and apply for further temporary permits.  The whole 
process was aimed primarily at addressing the real and pressing need to accommodate 
whole families of Armenians, for example, living in Poland with an ambiguous status for 
several years. The arguments for the regularisation indicated that it was mainly an 
acknowledgment of the status quo, designed to facilitate the ability of established migrants 
(whose children attend school and who work or run a business) to emerge from the grey 
zone (the informal economy).  It was also designed to press the Ukrainian shuttling migrants 
to make the decision to leave without being noted in the register of unwanted foreigners.  
The regularisation program found no opponents and was unanimously accepted by 
Parliament, and was later extended until November 2004.23 
 
Visa policy was the only aspect of the parliamentary debate that managed to attract the 
attention of a broader segment of the Polish political scene.  The new visa regime for the CIS 
countries sparked the most controversy. The main source of contention was the manner of 
the implementation and the after-effects of such a measure.  The debate was most animated 
in early 2002 when several non-governmental organisations and independent experts offered 
a variety of approaches through opinion pieces, studies and reports. 24 
                                                 
21 Aliens Act of 13 June 2003 (Dz.U. 2003 No 128 item 1175) Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration 
regulation (Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji, Dz.U. 2003. No 147 item 1435) 
amended Administrative Code (Dz.U. 2000. No 98 item.1071) 
22 Agnieszka Weinar’s interviews with social partners during the Aliens Acts of 2003 parliamentary proceedings in 
May – June 2003.  
23 On the outcome and assessment of the programme, see the section on integration policy debates. 
24 See e.g.: Z. Najder, Polsko-ukraińskie asymetrie (Polish-Ukrainian Asymmetries), Rzeczpospolita, 08.11.2001; 
M. Mazur-Rafał, Głos za wprowadzeniem wiz (Voice in Favour of Visa Regime), Rzeczpospolita, 18.01.2002; B. 
Cichocki, Czas pozbawić sąsiadów złudzeń. W kontaktach ze Wschodem najważniejszy jest interes Polski (Time 
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Supporters of the new visa regime generally referred to the state interest, security arguments 
and fiscal benefits. For those supporters, visas represented an instrument of control and a 
greater ability to select people allowed into the Polish territory.  They admitted that it was not 
always an ideal instrument.  However, they maintained that it would not restrict their (CIS 
citizens) right to cross the eastern border into Poland.  Instead, it should be seen as an 
indispensable tool of managing the traffic of people.  Their opponents rebuffed the latter 
argument, claiming that in view of the existing condition of border infrastructure, it would be 
in practice very difficult to freely cross the border into Poland.  They believed and still do that 
the Polish people have a sui generis moral duty to support the process of democracy in the 
East and that the opportunity of travel and observation of the transition effects as exemplified 
by Poland is an indispensable instrument of this support.  Any rationing of that opportunity 
would, in their view, slow down the process of democracy and restrict the rights of a 
substantial Polish minority in those countries.  The debate also provided economic 
arguments (such as the erosion of trade contacts), social arguments (trade slump depriving 
the poor border communities of their only source of income), fiscal arguments (combating the 
grey zone, or the ‘informal economy’) and political arguments (implementation of the acquis 
as the sine qua non of the accession). 
 
Socio-economic aspects of immigration policies 
 
The period leading up to the accession could be seen largely as a complex technical 
exercise in which the agenda was dominated by the Ministry of Interior’s concerns over legal 
and institutional requirements of adoption of the JHA acquis, exemplified by the focus on 
security measures and border control procedures in the debates on immigration.  However, 
with the establishment of the Office on Repatriation and Aliens as a central government 
agency to deal with asylum, entry and residence of foreigners, the long-standing experts’ 
argument to work out a broader concept of state migration policy received a boost.  The 
Office initiated work on a relevant government paper in November 2002 and experts from 
other ministries and associated bodies; research institutes, academia and the non-
governmental sector were all invited to participate. Unfortunately however, the impact 
remains limited.  
 
On the one hand, the forum has demonstrated that the expert debate on migration issues no 
longer revolves around security to the extent that it did in the 1990s.  Since then precedence 
has been given to questions about the labour market, which is considered not only in terms 
of the protection of the Polish labour market (see the clause on the priority accorded to 
Polish citizens in the access to job offers) but increasingly in view of the benefits which the 
foreigners could bring to the market (selection of foreigners with rare qualifications or about 
to invest in Poland)25. On the other hand, however, the results of the work have not been 
made public so far, and have thus had limited impact on the broader domestic debate. 
 
Arguments based on the social and economic policies appeared first in the course of the 
debate over the necessity and form of introducing a visa requirement for the nationals of 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.  Some controversy arose over the assessment of the economic 
effects of Poland's implementation of the Schengen acquis. The issues raised concentrated 
on the possible weakening of cross-border and bazaar trade, the collapse of the export 
agreements with eastern markets, and the drop in revenue from the trade-related services, 
which could eliminate what is often a sole source of income for the residents of the Polish 
                                                                                                                                                        
to Be Blunt to Neighbours. Poland’s Interest is Overriding in Contacts with the East), Rzeczpospolita, 14.02.2002, 
J. Boratyński, Nie odgradzajmy się od sąsiadów ze Wschodu (Let Us Not Build Fences Against Neighbours to the 
East) Rzeczpospolita, 07.02.2002. 
25 Based on the internal minutes from the sessions. 
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eastern borderlands.  Nonetheless, long-term advantages of this measure were stressed.26  It 
is still important to note that until recently, immigration had not been discussed in terms of 
social or economic policy, nor was it perceived as an option within these policies.  The high 
level of unemployment was also a key objective.   
 
At the same time, the presence of foreigners in Poland is still a relatively new social 
phenomenon, and constituting just a small fraction of the population, foreigners are not 
perceived as a burning social issue. 
 
The employment of foreigners does not appear as a separate issue in the first National 
Action Plan for Employment, accepted in September 2004,27 which builds on the earlier 
National Strategy of Employment Growth and Human Resource Development.28  Overcoming 
the social exclusion of refugees is treated briefly in the context of other disadvantaged social 
groups, but unlike in the cases of women or specific age categories, no policy proposals are 
offered.  The lack of references to the presence or desirability of foreigners per se on the 
Polish labour market reflects the Plan’s preoccupation with persisting negative trends in the 
domestic workforce: on the one hand, the rapid expansion of the working-age population 
puts pressure on the national job market which still displays limited absorption capacity; on 
the other hand, the existing labour pool is under utilized given continued high unemployment 
(most notably in the youth category) and declining participation rate (especially among the 
over-50-year-olds), which is likely to strain the social-security system. The document 
overlooks the demand for foreign labour in the short term as it posits as the main objective, 
the reduction of the unemployment rate from nearly 19 to 15 per cent and assumes that 
raising the participation of domestic workforce in the legal market and improving the skills in 
the country’s population would be key elements of the national strategy.  In general, the Plan 
does not foresee the role of foreigners in filling the gaps on the national labour market. 
 
However, several of the document’s recommendations on the ways in which the Polish 
labour market could promote entrepreneurship and tackle the informal economy, two 
initiatives that are relevant to foreign workforce.  Some studies point out that low-cost foreign 
workers are unlikely to legalise their employment in Poland for the same reasons as their 
Polish counterparts (also in the informal economy).29  High social-security charges would 
undercut the competitiveness of both groups in their particular niches. The Plan refers to 
existing and planned policies easing the procedures for establishing small and medium 
enterprises, and foresees support for micro-businesses (of fewer than nine persons).  This 
could indirectly stimulate the demand for foreign labour, which already finds employment 
primarily in very small businesses (especially those established by the Polish nationals of 
Vietnamese origin, who generally employ their ethnic compatriots).  Self-employment, which 
is to be encouraged through reductions in social-security charges and facilitated access to 
bank credits, could in turn be of interest to foreign high-skilled professionals currently facing 
barriers to salaried employment.  In fact, some initiatives, which appear to target Polish 
workers, are in fact of far greater relevance to foreign employees: tax relief for the persons 
legally hiring domestic workers and babysitters would primarily result in the legalisation of the 
employment of women from Ukraine and other CIS countries, presently dominating this 
segment of the labour market.  Finally, the stimulation of non-farming economic activity in the 
countryside could potentially open opportunities to employment of foreigners in the budding 
rural service sector (including tourism, hospitality and retail trade), especially in the areas 
                                                 
26 W. M. Orłowski, Konsekwencje ekonomiczne Schengen (Economic Effects of Schengen), in: Polska droga do 
Schengen. Opinie ekspertów (Polish Road to Schengen), op. cit., p. 97 nn. 
27 National Action Plan for Employment for 2005, Ministry of Economy and Labour, accepted by the Council of 
Ministers on 21 September 2004. 
28 National Strategy of Employment Growth and Human Resource Development for 2000-2006, accepted by the 
Council of Ministers on 4 January 2000. 
29 Maciej Duszczyk and Joanna Korczynska, Demand for foreign labour in Poland—attempt at analysis and 
conclusions for migration policy (in Polish), Institute of Public Affairs/National Chamber of Economy, 2005. 
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near Poland’s eastern borders.  Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the Plan fails to 
address implications of these policies on potential employment of foreigners in the Polish 
labour market. 
 
Poland’s unfinished economic transformation process and the twin challenges of high 
unemployment rate (which includes a significant component of structural joblessness) and a 
large supply of domestic labour are cited as challenges for the full implementation of the 
Lisbon strategy on employment in Poland.30 Job creation, and improvement of labour 
productivity and competitiveness of domestic small and medium enterprises absorb at least 
some of the inactive working-age population.  Such measures are therefore seen as key 
elements of national employment strategy.  Thus the omission of issues related to the need 
for foreign labour (with the exception of high-skilled professionals working in subsidiaries of 
foreign companies, welcomed as a form of knowledge transfer) is not accidental, but remains 
in line with the general policy trend. 
 
However, neither official documents nor expert studies reveal serious concerns about the 
impact of foreign labour on the level of unemployment. Most studies focus on the 
endogenous barriers to job growth, such as high administrative costs, low internal mobility or 
mismatch of skills and local demand. The impact is lower than what could be expected by 
observing the aggregate numbers of foreigners on the Polish market (less than one per cent) 
(Duszczyk, Korczynska) once the concentration of foreign workforce in large cities is taken 
into account.  Warsaw, which records the largest, most diverse and visible group of migrants, 
enjoys the lowest rate of unemployment (under five per cent) and is a magnet for newcomers 
from other parts of Poland. 
 
Demographic arguments for a need to consider importing immigrants into Poland have so far 
only been discussed in small expert circles,31 and due to the sensitive conditions of the 
labour market, they have not become a subject of a political debate.  The current 
demographic structure in Poland and changes in it have been well researched.  A case in 
point is the First Demographic Congress in Poland, convened on the initiative of the 
Government Population Council, Polish Demographic Society and the Committee of 
Demographic Sciences of the Polish Academy of Science (PAN).  The results of the research 
presented at the Congress show that the process of ageing has accelerated in Poland.  In 
1990, 18.6 per cent of the population were retired - in 2000 this proportion grew to 24.4 per 
cent.  In simple terms, there were 44 retired persons for every 100 workers in 1990 and 62 
pensioners per 100 workers in 2000.  The forecasts for the period until 2010 predict that the 
productive-age population will increase at the rate of 170,000 persons annually and will 
decrease only after 2010.32  The average life expectancy increased by three years for men 
(to 69.7) in 2000 and 2.5 years for women (78 years).  The 1990s faced an unprecedented 
demographic regress – birth rates went down from 2.04 children per woman in 1990 to 1.34 
                                                 
30 Tadeusz Zoltowski, Sectoral Operational Programme Improvement of the Competitiveness of the Economy—
Analysis of Changes in Draft and Final Versions, expert opinion for the Ministry of Economy, Labour and Social 
Policy (in Polish), January 2004, p. 9. 
31 Z. Strzelecki, Polska a Europa. Procesy demograficzne u progu XXI w. (Poland and Europe: Demographic 
Process at the Turn of the 21st Century). Paper of the Congress Commitee, in: Polska a Europa. Procesy 
demograficzne u progu XXI w. (Poland and Europe: Demographic Processes at the Turn of the 21st Century), op. 
cit., p. 45. Also: B. Balcerzak-Paradowska et al., Założenia polityki ludnościowej w Polsce (Foundations of Polish 
population policy), IPiSS [http://www.ipiss.com.pl/teksty/politykalud.doc] 
32 J. Kropiwnicki, Społeczno-ekonomiczne konsekwencje starzenia się społeczeństwa (Socio-economic 
consequences of population ageing), in: Z. Strzelecki, A. Ochocki (eds.) Polska a Europa. Procesy demograficzne 
u progu XXI w. (Poland and Europe: Demographic Processes at the Turn of the 21st Century), vol. 1, Rządowa 
Rada Ludnościowa, Rządowe Centrum Studiów Strategicznych, Warsaw 2001, p. 19. 
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in 2000, while the overall rate dropped from 14.3 down to 9.8 per each 1,000 persons.33  




It follows from this analysis of the Polish political discourse that migration has not been a 
major issue so far.  The work on amending the Act on Aliens did not reveal any other 
migration policy proposals that would compete against the government-sponsored bill.  On 
one hand, this was due to the lack of tradition and experience in the field of migration policy 
by the Polish State and hence the lack of experience and tradition in the conduct of a public 
discourse on immigration.  On the other hand, the need to implement the acquis 
communautaire saw Polish policy stakeholders faced with a series of unprecedented 
practical problems that had to be regulated by the Polish law.  The new problems had to be 
explored and remedied with specific solutions over a relatively short period of time.  As time 
was running short for that debate, so did its substantive content.  The successive Polish 
ruling teams prioritised consensus around the issue of Poland’s membership in the EU, 
which signified an all-embracing approach to Poland’s integration with EU structures rather 
than building consensus over piecemeal issues with the risk of delaying the Polish 
accession. That is why the Polish debate on migration has not been a subject in itself, but 
rather a function of the accession process. 
 
 




The integration debate is also limited in Poland.    The main reason is that it targets very few 
people.  Following the citizenship criteria we can distinguish between immigrants with regular 
or irregular status, and refugees.  Irregular immigrants are rarely subject to integration 
measures; and legal immigration is not recruitment-driven, therefore no legal provisions have 
been dedicated to them.  Refugees are the only group of foreigners with established rights, 
and they are the key recipients of integration programmes. 
 
Of the major groups in Poland, there are few who qualify for integration programmes: 
 
The largest group of foreigners in Poland are citizens from Ukraine.  However, they are not 
permanent residents.  Instead, they engage in shuttle migration, coming and going according 
to their visa validity period (maximum of 90 days).  Ukrainians come to Poland as petty 
traders or illegal workers, and a most are not in need of any integration programs.    
 
The Vietnamese are also numerous, estimated at around 20-30,000 people,35 of different 
status (regular and irregular).  They live mainly in big cities, mostly in Warsaw, where they 
have established networks and are often involved in market trade.   
 
There are also significant numbers of Armenians, who came to Poland after the crisis in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.   
 
                                                 
33 T. Toczyński, Statystyka demograficzna w Polsce (Demographic Statistics in Poland), in: Z. Strzelecki, A. 
Ochocki (eds.) Polska a Europa. Procesy demograficzne u progu XXI w. (Poland and Europe: Demographic 
Processes at the Turn of the 21st Century), op. cit., p. 31. 
34 Podstawowe informacje o rozwoju demograficznym Polski (Basic information on the demographic development 
of Poland), Warszawa 1999; also J. Bijak, D. Kupiszewska, M. Kupiszewski, K. Saczuk, Impact of international 
migration on population dynamics and labour force resources in Europe, Warsaw 2005. 
35 Kepińska, E., Recent trends in International Migration - SOPEMI 2004 for Poland, Seria Prace Migracyjne no. 
56, ISS UW, Warszawa. 
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There are large numbers of Chechens too, most of whom have either been granted formal 
refugee status, or the ‘tolerated stay’ status.  Several thousands of them live in Poland, 
representing the largest single group under protection, but the majority perceive Poland as a 
temporary stop on their way west.   
 
Repatriates are another large group – most of whom come from the former states of the 
USSR.  They receive Polish citizenship when they enter Poland.  Repatriates are eligible to 
take part in an integration scheme.   
 




Because of small numbers,36 legal immigrants are not a group that receive any particular 
attention from policy makers or the public.  Their existence continues without any real 
objections and their status is not a widely discussed issue in the context of new laws or 
regulations.  
 
Legal immigrants are the group least dependent on the State policies, which means they 
receive no support, and they do not suffer much everyday discrimination.37  Legal immigrants 
take care of their own integration themselves, in both the economic and the cultural sense.  
However, they encounter serious legal and bureaucratic obstacles due to regulations on 
access to housing, social services or employment, where a wide range of permits are 
needed.   
 
It must be remembered that legalisation of stay concerns only particular individuals, 
educated or determined enough not to choose the easier irregular status.  Their success in 
Poland depends on personal contacts and their ability to adapt skills.  In Poland, immigrants 
do not live in ghettos (Weinar), they are in constant communication with the rest of society, 
the broader society is therefore forced to acknowledge their presence and make at least a 
minimal effort towards acceptance.  It is also important to note that most have committed to a 
future in Poland, and as such, they will probably pursue Polish citizenship, and ultimately 
gain equal status and political rights.  At the moment, this group of immigrants tend to 
assimilate rather than integrate, but the situation may change if their numbers grow in the 
future. 
 
The only section of this group that attracts the attention of policy makers are foreign 
students.  There are over 8,000 foreign students in Polish universities (Kępińska).  The 
debate on student integration has been connected to the debate on economic migration.  
While discussing the Aliens Act of 2003, the idea of pro-student immigration policy was 
rejected.  Some MPs and social actors, such as the Helsinki Foundation, argued that 
students, especially graduates, possess a certain capital that could be of use to Poland.  
They also identified students as a group that integrate easily, and because they are a ‘non-
problematic group’, they should be encouraged to stay.  The debate was not successful in 
the sense that the arguments rejecting any possibility of immigration prevailed.  However, 
they are able to count their years of study in applications for permanent residency.38  
                                                 
36 In May 2002 there were only slightly over 49,000 residents, who held only one, (non-Polish) citizenship. (Polish 
National Census 2002. Raport z wyników Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań, GUS, 
Warszawa 2003 (National Census 2002)) 
37 Agnieszka Weinar, “Tak daleko stąd, tak blisko – europeizacja polskiej polityki migracyjnej wobec legalnych 
imigrantów, uchodźców i repatriantów” w Iglicka K. (red.), Integracja czy dyskryminacja? Polskie wyzwania i 
dylematy u progu wielokulturowości, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa 2003. 
38 The government opted to delay a comprehensive settlement of the issue of foreign students until late 2005 or 
early 2006 by incorporating Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission 
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Another category, family members, entered Poland through their entitlement to family 
reunification.  Family members of legal aliens or foreign members of a Polish citizen’s family 
are defined as spouses and children, biological or adopted.  In case of a refugee 
unaccompanied minor, the family is defined as parents or grandparents.  It is important to 
note that reunified family members are currently not covered with any specific integration 
measures.  This omission may be explained by the fact that integration programmes remain 
limited, concentrating mainly on refugees.  However, the limitation should not be seen as 
definitive given continuing amendments of the national legislation. 
 
Foreign spouses of Polish citizens represent a particular interest in this category.  Although 
the official position does not consider their integration a major issue; their welfare has been 
considered in the debates on consecutive amendments of the Aliens Act (including the 
debate in 2005).  The debate attracted attention of some political parties and involved the 
Helsinki Foundation and the Ombudsman Office.  In 2003, the residence period required to 
apply for permanent residence was shortened, from five to two years.  This was considered a 
necessary change from the point of view of the family; and it has a practical impact on 
citizenship policy, as in practice it limits the period of residence required for receiving Polish 
citizenship from approximately 10 years (binding all legal immigrants) to most likely seven 
years. 
 
Apart from liberalising the resident requirements for mixed couples, the Aliens Law of 2003 
introduced clauses to combat fraudulent marriages.  The legal solution was seen to be 
necessary as about 10 per cent of over 6,000 mixed marriages were found not to be 
genuine.   Article 55 of the Aliens Law enumerates general indications that this problem 
exists, allowing the Governor of Province to undertake proper action.  However, the general 
arguments given in the debate are against too much involvement by the State in the issues 
of marriage.  
 
It must be noted, that the majority of MPs or Senators’ interventions so far have been for 
mixed marriages.  It seems that the administration of the law in this sphere is often unjust, 
and even overused.39  Those active in the field of human rights, UNHCR and the Helsinki 
Foundation,40 are trying to combat this type of discrimination.  In the parliamentary debate, 
the well being of the family was the main criterion for all concerned, regardless of political 
affiliation.  In this atmosphere, the issue of fraudulent marriages was tackled, but the general 
climate was in favour of the mixed marriages and family rights. 
 
Irregular immigrants  
 
It is estimated that there are between 100,000 and 600,000 irregular migrants in Poland.  
Their presence is widely discussed, however, the discussions take place in a different 
contexts.  Expulsion, deportation and imprisonment are debated more frequently than 
integration.  This should not come as a surprise – illegal immigration is found everywhere in 
the world – and there is often more concern about legalisation than integration schemes.  
The Polish experience with shuttle migration from the neighbouring countries indicates that 
the people coming to the country either stick to the shuttle-migration rhythm, or end up in a 
prolonged state of illegality.  Only very few try to obtain some legal recognition.  This is 
despite that fact that their irregular status deprives them of formal access to social services, 
although they do have access to emergency medical services.  Their children are also able 
to enrol in public schools as the Polish constitution guarantees the right to universal basic 
                                                                                                                                                        
of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary 
service.  See the session of the Internal Affairs parliamentary committee of 18 January 2005. 
39 4th term, 49th session, 1st day (20.05.2003) 
40 1800/IV, Committee for Internal Affairs and Administration /no 84/ 06-05-2003 
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education to all persons residing in the national territory, and schools verify residence status 
only occasionally. 
 
The persistence of relatively liberal visa policies towards the residents of neighbouring CIS 
states has helped to disguise the growing issue of foreigners who, following their arrival on 
short-term visas, take up residence and employment in the country.  The last amendment of 
the aliens act prior to EU accession, which included a regularisation campaign, addressed 
the issue of the status of these people.  Regularisation was available to those who could 
demonstrate residence in Poland dating back to at least 1997 (the date of the first EU-
accession-driven amendment of the law on aliens) and sufficient financial resources for 
obtaining a year long residence permit.  However, only 3,508 migrants used this opportunity 
to legalise their stay.  Among them, the two major groups were Armenians (46 per cent) and 
Vietnamese (38 per cent).  The program was reopened until November 30, 2004, during 
which period an additional 2,413 migrants obtained permits.  Again, the Armenians and the 
Vietnamese comprised respectively 44 per cent and 41 per cent of the total (Kępińska).   
 
Although the programme resolved the issue of irregular migrants of those two established 
ethnic groups, it did not address the problem of the growth of irregular transit migrants or the 
rise in the numbers of more recent overstayers. Nor did it attract much attention from the 
nationalities, representing the bulk of illegal workers or traders who until 2003 enjoyed a visa-
free regime (Belarusians, Russians or Ukrainians).  The regularisation failed resolve the 
issue of the presence of this group because of the strict requirements - length of stay, 
financial and housing conditions, and their lack of interest in long-term immigration as they 




Refugees are the most prominent group of foreigners, not for their numbers (there were 
8,079 applications in 2004, 305 were recognised refugees, and 832 people granted tolerated 
stay) (Data Office for Repatriates and Foreigners, www.uric.gov.pl) but for their presence in 
the public and political discourse.  The refugee question is framed as a humanitarian and a 
solidarity issue, and the tone of the debate is set by international organisations.  Refugee 
status is based on international legal provisions, adopted by Poland, which means that the 
refugees enjoy internationally recognised rights.  The Polish State and the international 
community guarantee these rights, giving refugees two avenues of appeal. 
 
Refugees are the only immigrant group whose individual needs were recognised in the 
National Action Plan for Social Inclusion.  As the only foreign group, refugees can participate 
in an integration programme. The Polish law guarantees that refugees have free access to 
accommodation, employment, health services and education.  The new Act on Social 
Welfare41 provides Polish language classes, vocational training, and cash benefits for 
specific purposes, such as rent, food and clothes etc.  
 
In reality, however, refugees encounter a number of challenges during their integration 
process.  Refugees have difficulties finding a place to live, or getting a job, and the Act does 
not offer adequate solutions.  The serious weakness of the present system is that the 
refugees, who should be preparing for their future in Poland, can only count on a sum of 
money from the state, often not enough to meet their needs.  
 
However, the integration policy failures are perhaps more often linked to the difficult general 
situation of Poland, where even native Poles encounter serious problems in everyday life.  
The refugees, aware of their special status, are generally also aware of drawbacks of the 
Polish socio-economic reality.  They know that it is difficult to demand special treatment, as, 
                                                 
41 Act of 12 March 2004 on Social Welfare  (Journal of Laws No 64, item. 593), chapter 5. 
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for example, in employment, during a period of very high unemployment in Poland.  
Refugees are apparently the most marginalised group of the foreigners, despite the 
integration programs.  They often have to balance on the edge of the extreme poverty, 
sharing the resources with the poorest Polish social strata and they are not really integrated 
in the society on any level - economic, social, or cultural.42 
 
NGO’s often campaign about the need to integrate refugees, based on humanitarian 
grounds, but the government clearly states that Poland can offer only a minimum standard.  
There is no anti-refugee talk; however, the atmosphere around the inflows is one of high 
diffidence and mixed feelings.  It looks as though the low quality of the integration scheme is 
effectively pushing refugees out of the country, to Western Europe, places that might offer 
better opportunities.  
 
The debate between the major actors, i.e. UNHCR and Polish policy makers, has evolved 
around the difficult economic situation of the country in general.  As the government states, 
the integration program cannot be developed properly, since the lack of funds concerns not 
only refugees but also the native population.  In a situation where there is general scarcity, 
for example in accommodation, it would be politically risky to provide preferential treatment to 
foreigners.  Such arguments are opposed by the NGOs, who say that it in the long run it is 
more expensive to keep a refugee family on welfare than to give it a boost at the beginning 
so it can start earning a living and become independent.  Another important argument 
concerns a potential benefit of refugee’s qualifications and skills.  However, this argument 




The last group, repatriates, number around 8,000 (2005).  Repatriation concerns people of 
Polish origin who have been migrating to Poland from the states of the former Soviet Union 
since the beginning of the 1990s.  The process of their return was not regulated until 1997 
and they were treated like any other foreigners coming to Poland.43  This group is protected 
by the separate Repatriation Act of 2000, which is designed to recognise their special status.  
This Act grants them access to the only fully developed integration policy that includes not 
only the State, but also the society. 
 
They generally enjoy a high degree of acceptance, partially thanks to their Polish origins, 
partially because of the manner in which they immigrate: repatriation is a community issue, it 
is decided upon and organised by a community willing to host a repatriate.44  Such framing of 
the programme helps to rule out most discriminatory practices.  At the same time, a lot of 
Polish citizens fail to recognise repatriation as a significant issue.  However, they do not 
regard the newcomers as compatriots because of language barriers (their Russian accent or 
insufficient knowledge of the Polish language).45 
 
                                                 
42 Section on Poland in: Monika Mazur-Rafał, E, Zienkiewicz, Equality, Diversity and Enlargement: Report on 
measures to combat discrimination in acceding and candidate countries, European Commission: DG 4, Brussels 
2003. 
43 For an overview of the process of repatriation in the 1990s and early legal and institutional solutions, see: P. 
Hut, Warunki zycia i proces adaptacji repatriantow w Polsce w latach 1992-2000 [Living conditions and adaptation 
process of the repatriates in Poland 1992-2000], Institute of Social Policy, University of Warsaw 2002. 
44 The extent of the assistance depends on the place of origin of the repatriates. Typically, in cases of persons 
originally resident in the non-European part of the former USSR, local governments provide free housing to the 
repatriates, while the central state budget funds are disbursed in the form of cash benefits in the initial period of 
the repatriates’ stay in Poland. The assistance is more limited and offered on a discretionary basis to the other 
repatriates. See http://www.mswia.gov.pl/cudzo_rep_eng1.html 
45 See e.g. K. Iglicka, “Are they fellow-countrymen or not? The migration of Kazakhs of Polish origin from 
Kazakhstan to Poland”, Working Paper No. 13, Institute for Social Studies at University of Warsaw 1997, p. 14.  
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The repatriation policy model depends on budgetary resources, ”no money, no repatriation” – 
the same philosophy cannot be used in the case of refugees or immigrants.  The policy helps 
repatriates, but the final success of their (re)integration depends on the repatriates 
themselves.  With Polish citizenship, repatriates do not encounter the same administrative 
problems as other legal immigrants.  Instead, their experience of integration is more similar 
to the refugee experience, but in their case the involvement of the community in their 
integration generally adds to the potential for success. 
 
Repatriates are viewed as a special category of aliens, who are not really foreigners but 
long-lost kinsmen, and thus in need of special treatment offered by the state.  The arguments 
are common on all the sides of the political spectrum: repatriation should be promoted, 
however, repatriates should be invited only if their basic needs, such as housing and 
employment, are met.  There is a general consensus about the importance of integration to 
keep repatriates on the surface of the society, not to let them fall through the cracks.  
 
However, there have also been some arguments for limiting the numbers.  The issue at hand 
revolves around the number of repatriates that should be dependent on the available 
resources.  On the one hand, right-wing parties were traditionally eager to accommodate the 
largest number of repatriates possible, seeing the process as historical compensation, while 
on the other hand the government and other parties favoured a more gradual approach, 
taking into account the budgetary limitations.  The Repatriation Act limited the geographic 
scope to the territory to which the ethnic Poles had been deported as part of Stalinist 
repressions, and where the distance to the homeland and local conditions made the 
continuation of Polish traditions most difficult.46 
 
The requirement for the local governments to provide housing and facilitate the entry of the 
repatriates into the job markets proved to be ambitious.  Local governments, fearing the 
financial consequences and negative attitude of local communities, have been generally 
reluctant to invite repatriates.47  In effect, the programme lured into immigration far fewer 
Polish descendants than it had been hoped. Instead, at times the repatriation process 
attracted enterprising individuals who considered it as the easiest legal migration channel in 
order to improve their economic status.  At the moment, the repatriation project is being 
reconsidered in government circles, as indicated by the statements from the Office of 
Repatriation and Aliens officials.  One of the arguments in the recent debate is that 
repatriation could address the country’s growing demographic imbalances as a key tool for 
gaining migrants in the future. 
 
Transposition of the EU directives on family reunification and long-term residents 
 
The new amendment of the aliens act was adopted by the Parliament on 22 April 2005.48  
The Act amends 18 other Acts, concerning inter alia aliens, registration of residents, 
education, social security, employment, juridical system, by introducing regulations coherent 
with the EU legislation on foreigners elaborated since 2003.  The Directive on Family 
Reunification is only one of six other directives considered.  The changes are few and they 
improve the existing law, making it more compatible with EU regulations.  In the 
parliamentary debate, apart from the consensus on the need to remedy any inconsistencies 
of the national acts with the acquis, some established issues, present in previous debates 
have reappeared.  For instance, some MPs raised the question of unequal status of foreign 
                                                 
46 The area covers Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the 
Asian part of Russia. See also ‘Discriminatory landscape’ Department of Journalism and Political Science, 
Warsaw University, 2003/2004, http://www.ips.uw.edu.pl/xenophob/xeno-pliki/Xeno_WP1_WP4_eng.pdf 
47 Hut, op.cit. 
48 Act Amending the Aliens Act of 13 June 2003 and Act on Granting Protection to Aliens on Polish Territory of 13 
June 2003 as well as other Acts (Journal of Laws No. 94, item 788) 
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In the political discourse, the whole integration process is still considered a question for the 
future.  However, the recent developments show that Polish decision makers have started to 
identify problems if the issue is ignored.50  While working on the amendment of the Aliens 
Acts that took place in late 2004 and early 2005, the question of future immigration emerged 
with greater frequency.  What used to be the domain of experts, scholars and specialised 
technocrats, has started to enter into political discourse.  As for now, the discourse is being 
framed as the need for preparation.  The actors involved point to the main standards of 
integration, as presented by the Western European models: state-driven support for ethnic 
diversity, meaning maintaining of languages, cultures, and religions.   
 
The fear among experts and practitioners is that the Polish society is not ready for a 
confrontation with settling communities of immigrants.  Some warn that Poles should be 
educated about the ideas and standards of integration before the actual massive inflows 
occur.  At the same time it should be noted that there are no pressing needs in Poland to 
address racism or xenophobia.  The EUMC report51 published on 15 March 2005 revealed 
that Poland is one of the least xenophobic countries in Europe. 
 
Against the relatively low-key official discourse on integration, efforts of non-government 
organisations (highlighted in part 2 of the paper) to assist foreigners, in particular refugees, in 
coping with the Polish realities take on special significance.  The UNHCR has worked with 
other groups in civil-society to raise the awareness of the society’s obligation to host persons 
in need of protection.  Chechens represent the largest ethnic group among protected 
persons (although regularly denied refugee status) and they have therefore become the 
object of media attention.  Despite the cultural gap, the Polish public has been generally 
sympathetic towards that group, which was helped by the relatively broad coverage of the 
Chechen conflict in the national media.  Nonetheless, the recent security concerns following 
the London attacks could undermine this positive climate. 
 
1.3 The brain-drain debate 
 
In Poland, brain drain is not often discussed.  This is largely because a) economic 
immigration is not a political issue, and b) there is no active recruitment policy.  When it does 
emerge, it usually does so on two levels and in two different perspectives: Europe-bound 
emigration and the repatriation of Polish communities from abroad. 
 
 Europe-bound emigration  
 
Discussions on active recruitment policies have not really taken shape in Poland, and 
considering the 19 per cent unemployment rate, it is not expected that they will start soon.  
Any concerns about the brain drain phenomena are pre-mature, and if they are mentioned, 
they are placed on a theoretical level, and spoken about only in terms of universal truths.  
Anti-brain-drain stances are taken mostly by the trade unions, involved in a Europe-wide 
campaign.  However, they do not express the fears at the public level.  Instead, they remain 
                                                 
49 (4th term, 101st Sejm session, 21 April 2005, item 29). 
50 Memorial of the Forecasts Committee „Poland 2000 Plus” at the Polish Academy of Sciences submitted to the 
top authorities of the Republic of Poland on the need to define state policy in the realm of foreign migrations, 
16.10.2002, in: Mołdawa T., Wojtaszczyk K.A, Szymański A., (eds.), Wymiar społeczny członkostwa Polski w Unii 
Europejskiej, INP UW, Warsaw 2003  
51 European Center for Monitoring Racism and Xenophobia,  Majority Attitudes towards Migrants and Minorities: 
Key findings from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey on 15 March 2005, Vienna, 2005.  
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mere ‘expert debates’ and the arguments and solutions are often no different from those 
used at the EU level. 
 
Generally speaking, representatives of trade unions, such as Solidarity,52 usually underline 
the responsibility of the EU towards countries of origin and the need to cooperate with them 
for the sake of the “brain gain”, e.g. through return migration programs.  However, no specific 
measures have been publicised on the national scene, nor introduced into the debate. 
 
In the present situation, the main problem in Poland is the brain drain of domestic resources.  
Competition within the EU is fierce, and in this environment, a number of high-skilled 
workers, especially in medical, financial, IT and scientific sectors are leaving Poland.  The 
debate on the emigration of Polish high-skilled workers after the enlargement has already 
started.  The main concerns raised relate to the ways Poland should deal with qualified 




The brain-drain debate has a different flavour when applied to the issue of the ethnic Poles in 
countries to the east.  The government has been active in administering a scholarship 
program for young citizens of the former USSR of Polish decent.  The main idea has been to 
prepare elites able to improve the position of Polish communities in their country of origin (in 
particular in the European part of the former Soviet Union).  In reality, the students have 
come to Poland to stay and there are no administrative means to send them back.  
 
Arguments against this phenomenon have been based on patriotic and idealistic 
assumptions – Polish communities need elites in their country of origin, not in Poland, in 
order to change their status quo.  The proposed remedy includes providing scholarships for 
studies in the country of origin; however, few students are interested in such an opportunity.  
The arguments against are thus not against immigration as such (the numbers amount to 
several hundred people), but against sidelining the main, patriotic, idea behind the 
scholarships. 
 
On the other hand, the Polish government does not oppose this type of immigration, linking it 
to the repatriation process.  The key argument here is that the State cannot place obstacles 
in the way of these people realising their dreams.  Because of this, the government has 
voiced its support for the proposal.  Nobody argues about the benefits or drawbacks of 
immigration.  The members of Polish community who are based abroad, but come to study 
and ultimately stay in Poland are not officially talked about as immigrants.  
 
Such a framing leaves room for speculations. We can say that although immigration is 
officially not connected to any foreign policy issues, nevertheless, there is a hidden gradation 
of immigration – it seems that members of Polish communities on the East will be lured in the 
first place. No one talks about official recruitment on a large scale, but small and effective 
actions, as the mentioned scholarships, provide a good quality group of immigrants. 
 
 
                                                 
52 European Centre of Natolin Foundation. “Greenbook on Economic Migration” expert debate on April 28, 2005. 
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Coordination among some major national institutions has been acknowledged as a priority 
due to the fact that the different sub-domains of the JHA are ‘owned’ by distinct, independent 
national players.  Thus, although the European Commission played a key role in shaping the 
process of implementing the acquis, the manner in which its recommendations were taken 
into account clearly depended on the positions and institutional interests of various agencies.  
Among the national institutions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and the 
Border Guards play key roles in their respective domains, while other ministries (Economy, 
Finance) and agencies (Office for Repatriation and Aliens, Office for European Integration, 
provincial governments) either limited themselves to technical tasks or had only indirect 
influence on the issue in question. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.msz.gov.pl) and the consular service.  The Consular 
Department oversees the Polish consular and visa policy, which includes the protection of 
rights and interests of the Polish citizens while staying abroad and the processing of 
foreigners' visa applications.  The Department was responsible for executing the Directive 
No. 574/99 of the Council of the European Communities, requiring introducing visas for the 
citizens of 15 post-communist countries.  Although the Department formally executes 
portions of the Schengen Action Plan and Strategy for Integrated Border Management, it 
retains autonomy from the Ministry of Interior, and has followed the Foreign Ministry’s 
rationale and approach to the issue.  A clear separation of competences was achieved 
through the 1990s with the Ministry of Interior so that the latter never attempted to coordinate 
the work of the Consular Department as part of executing the Schengen Action Plan’s 
provisions.  
 
This institutional division of competencies justifies considering visa policy a realm, which is 
indeed quite separate from border control.  Accordingly, the process of adjustment of the 
consular network and decisions on the visa fees were subordinated primarily to the lines of 
Polish foreign policy, among whose priorities is maintaining the tourist, trade and cultural 
exchange with the eastern neighbours, and Ukraine in particular.  Therefore, since 1998 
when the drop in tourist traffic and trade volume with the East sparked the first broader 
debate on adjustments to the visa and administrative instruments in light of the conditions on 
the eastern border, the Foreign Ministry proposed minimizing the barriers to cross-border 
movement in the first place, resorting to veiled criticism of the hard line approach of the 
Ministry of Interior.  The Department consistently views the visa policy as an instrument of 
foreign policy.  A decision was made; for instance, by the Polish President at a meeting with 
his Ukrainian partner in February 2003 that visa fees would not be charged of Ukrainian 
nationals.  Ukraine's decision to keep visa-free travel regime for the Polish citizens is in turn 
a solution, which the Polish Foreign Ministry would like to see extended to other CIS 
countries.  The Ministry has continued to work out bilateral arrangements on facilitating the 
conditions of obtaining Polish visas (Moldova in April 2004), and presses for more favourable 
solutions for Polish nationals (with the United States). 
 
Insights into the Ministry’s work can be gained by references to its annual Consular Report, 
revealing the basic statistics on visas issued, the location of consulates and changes in 
consular and visa policy.  The Minister of Foreign Affairs also presents a lengthy overview of 
Directions of Polish Foreign Policy to the Parliament every January.  The rationale for some 
of the policies can be assessed from reviewing the contents of the periodical International 
Affairs, containing contributions from the staff of the Ministry.  The issue of ‘Eastern policy’ 
was tackled in the official national ‘non-paper’, prepared by the Ministry with the participation 
of key non-governmental institutions and experts.  The paper initiated a period of closer 
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consultation of the Polish position on the details of the European Neighbourhood Policy with 
social partners, including many of those listed in the section on the Public Debate.  
 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (www.mswia.gov.pl) is the lead 
institution in charge of implementing the JHA acquis, overseeing the work of, inter alia, the 
police, the border guards and the office for repatriation and aliens.  The ministry has initiated 
the legislative activities, leading to the changes in national legislation on aliens, citizenship, 
repatriation, border control, etc.  The Minister of Interior has presided since October 1998 
over the interdepartmental team for managing the state border, which gathered high-rank 
representatives from 17 state institutions.  Regular sessions, at which other state organs 
were represented (e.g. Provincial governors), produced a detailed plan of border 
management for the period until accession and the guidelines of the strategy until 2010. 
Department of European Integration and International Cooperation issued in June 2000 the 
national “Strategy of Integrated Border Management”, which became a starting point for the 
discussion on the cooperation of the state with other institutions.  Currently, the Department 
of International Cooperation coordinates and reports on the efforts of various institutions to 
meet the obligations of the Schengen Action Plan ahead of planned full accession to the 
Schengen Agreement in 2007. 
 
The Border Guard (www.sg.gov.pl) is formally subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and 
represents the key agency implementing the controlling functions in the areas of entry, 
residence and departure of foreigners.  Until the passage of a new Border Guard Act in 2001, 
the force had the right to issue permits for crossing the border (including visas).53  The Guard 
has been the main recipient of the Commission’s expectations about improved border 
security tightening as well as of the Schengen Facility financing.54  It is directly responsible 
for carrying out relevant portions of the Schengen Action Plan.  Moreover, Polish Border 
Guards are involved in extensive schemes of cooperation, ranging from operational 
collaboration (joint controls on the Polish-German frontier, execution of readmission 
agreements—see section on Border Control for details) to information exchange at the 
European Council’s Working Group on Borders.  
 
Paradoxically, due to the high profile of the issue of border control and considerable 
investments made into the border since 1990, the Border Guard is increasingly open about 
the actual pressure on the frontier infrastructure and security challenges.  The Border Guards 
headquarters serve as the clearing-house and analytical centre for detailed statistics on 
cross-border movement of persons and goods (in cooperation with the Customs Service, 
working under the Ministry of Finance).  The Border Guard prepares annual reports, training 
materials, research publications and statistical tables, comprehensively covering various 
migration flows across the state borders.55 The institution’s greater openness about the 
manner in which the travellers are treated was fundamental to the monitoring of conditions 
for asylum-seekers and CIS travellers at the border conducted by non-governmental 
organisations.56 
 
                                                 
53 Art. 1 p. 2 of the Act on the Border Guard of 12 October 1990 (Dz. U. Official Journal no. 78, item. 642 with 
subsequent amendments). 
54 J. Białocerkiewicz (ed.), Wschodnia granica RP zewnętrzną granicą Unii Europejskiej, materiały z konferencji 
(Poland’s eastern border as the external border of the EU), Border Guard Training Centre, Kętrzyn 2001. 
55 The Border Guard Training Centre in Ketrzyn in north-eastern Poland organises public conferences and 
publishes an analytical quarterly, Problemy Ochrony Granic (Issues in Border Protection). Quarterly and annual 
statistics and graphs may be downloaded at: www.sg.gov.pl 
56 H. Rubinstein et al., Raport z monitoringu granicznych placówek kontrolnych Straży Granicznej w zakresie 
realizacji prawa do ubiegania się o status uchodźcy w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Report on the monitoring of the 
border control facilities of the Border Guards in view of the execution of the right to asylum in the Republic of 
Poland), Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights: Warsaw 1998;   
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The Office for Repatriation and Aliens (URiC) (www.uric.gov.pl) was established by the 
amended act on aliens on 11 April 2001.57  It took over a broad set of issues concerning 
foreigners from the Department for Migration and Asylum of the Ministry of Interior.  The 
institution issues decisions on refugee and repatriation status, long-term residence, conducts 
related administrative procedures and oversees the assistance to repatriates, recognised 
refugees and temporarily protected persons and manages centres for asylum-seekers.  The 
office manages the register of foreigners applying for long-term visas, repatriation and 
residing in Poland and undertakes regular analyses on migratory movement and asylum-
seekers.  The president of the office is responsible for the coordination of the state 
administration's activities in the field of repatriation and aliens, and developing a state policy 
concept on aliens.58 The office has stepped up its consultations with non-governmental 
experts on the development of comprehensive national migration policy.59  
 
Provincial governors' offices and local governments. The Act on Aliens of 1997 
centralised the decision-making on visa applications, transferring the process from the level 
of the governor's office to that of the minister.  Administrative reform, which took place in 
1999 decentralised the process for residence registration (including the registration of 
aliens), welfare provision, programmes for combating unemployment as well as health care 
and education.  Provincial governors are authorised, inter alia, to grant or deny the following 
documents: a fixed-time residence visa, a settlement visa for employment purposes to a 
foreign national who had been granted an extension on the permit for employment or taking 
up another employment, a fixed-time residence permit or settlement permit. Governors may 
also issue or replace residence cards.60 
  
The Ministry of Economy and Labour (www.mgip.gov.pl/) and the Ministry of Social 
Policy  (www.mps.gov.pl/) are the main bodies of authority responsible for the issues of 
employment, including the employment of aliens.61 The Ministries participate in drafting the 
legal framework for temporary employment in Poland and supervise its implementation.62 
The Ministry of Economy gathers statistics on the expenditure of aliens in Poland and 
commissions studies on the economic activities of foreigners, including those in the informal 
sector. The institution has consistently stressed the positive aspect of foreigners’ short-term 
visits to Poland for tourist and business purposes for the local communities, especially in the 
borderlands. The Ministry of Social Policy also assists aliens who for various reasons rely on 
welfare service of social assistance centres (including refugees, who benefit from annual 
integration programmes, and other aliens who cannot cope with the Polish reality). 
 
The Ministry of Finance (www.mofnet.gov.pl) and the Customs Service 
(www.mofnet.gov.pl/sluzba_celna/) are indirectly interested in cross-border traffic. Despite 
their concerns with the large-scale smuggling and shortfall in revenue to the state budget, 
especially in excise-taxed alcohol and tobacco imports due to organised illegal activities, the 
institutions’ estimates of the potential losses to the small businesses and households due to 
                                                 
57 Act of 11 April 2001 amending the Act on Aliens and some other laws, (Dz. U. – Official Journal no 127, 
item1400).  
58 Art. 68c of the Act of 11 April 2001 amending the Act on Aliens and some other laws, op. cit. See also 
www.mswia.gov.pl/cudzo.html 
59 For instance, the Office began activities on a national document on the assumptions of the Polish migration 
policy in November 2002 and sought input from a range of government organs and research institutions, including 
the IPA. 
60 Articles 79 and 82 of the Act of 11 April 2001 on the amendments to the act on aliens and to some other acts, 
op.cit. 
61 Until 1 January 2003 merged into Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (www.mpips.gov.pl).  
62 Podstawowe kierunki działania Ministra Pracy i Polityki Społecznej w 2003 r.(Basic action lines by the Minister 
of Labour and Social Policy) www.mg.gov.pl/ 
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the collapse of cross-border ‘suitcase trade’ have been behind arguments for liberal visa 
solutions.63 
 
The Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) (www.ukie.gov.pl) was 
involved in the review of Polish legislation against the acquis and the collection of information 
on the progress of implementation of the acquis by line ministries.  However, given the 
clearly dominant role of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior in the initiatives of legal 
changes (e.g. Laws on aliens) and management of union funds (e.g. The Schengen facility), 
the UKIE played a rather indirect role in the actual implementation process. 
 
 
Research institutions  
 
The Center for International Relations (www.csm.org.pl) is an independent research 
institute, focusing on the analysis of Polish foreign policy, European integration and security 
policy and Poland’s international environment The experts affiliated with the Center’s 
Migration and Eastern Programme have raised the issues of the assumptions of the national 
migration policy,64 while the Center’s conferences allowed for the presentation of 
international perspectives on EU’s migration policies. 65 
 
The Institute of Public Affairs’ (www.isp.org.pl) Migration and Eastern Policy Programme 
has worked on issues of Poland’s relations with neighbours and the eastern policy of the 
European Union, including the impact of the Schengen acquis for the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE).  Other issue areas cover free movement of labour and the 
globalisation of labour markets, return migration and repatriation in CEE.66 The Institute’s 
experts prepared an analytical study for the sitting of the Senate Committee for Foreign 
Relations and European Integration on the subject “Poland and the other applicant countries 
vis-à-vis the Schengen acquis obligations.” Along with other contributions, the Institute 
focuses on assessing the political, economic and social effects of introducing the acquis 
requirements, as published in their comprehensive policy publication.67 The Institute built on 
this expertise by co-ordinating a multinational project with several other policy institutes, 
representing both prospective EU Member States and their non-EU neighbours. The policy 
implications of the introduction of the Schengen acquis on the new borderlands and national 
policies of both Poland and other Central and East European states were presented in a 
series of case studies, and conclusions were drawn for both national and EU policies.68  
 
                                                 
63 See for instance W. Orlowski, “Konsekwencje ekonomiczne Schengen” (Economic consequences of 
Schengen) in: Polska droga do Schengen: Opinie ekspertow, IPA: Warsaw 2000, pp. 89-109. 
64 See M. Mazur-Rafał, Głos za wprowadzeniem wiz (Voice in Favour of the Visa Regime), Rzeczpospolita, 
18.01.2002, Koniunktura dla imigracji (An Immigration Boom), Unia & Polska, 1-15.08.2002, Granice pod kontrolą 
(Borders under Control), Rzeczpospolita, 09.08.2002, Kłopoty z gośćmi (Trouble with Visitors), Unia & Polska, 
12.09.2002, Goście pilnie potrzebni (Visitors Urgently Wanted), Unia & Polska, 05.12.2002. 
65 “The European Union’s common immigration policy? Experience of the EU’s present and future border 
countries: Austria, Germany, Italy, Hungary and Poland” in association with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in 
Poland, 24 and 25.05.2002, Jachranka; “Poland as a future frontier country of the EU. New opportunities and new 
challenges”, meeting with the MSWiA’s undersecretary of state, Zenon Kosiniak-Kamysz, 12.11.2002, Warsaw.  
66 See e.g. ed. K. Iglicka, Integracja czy dyskryminacja? Polskie wyzwania i dylematy u progu wielokulturowosci, 
[Integration or discrimination? Polish challenges and dilemmas on the threshold of multiculturalism], IPA Warsaw 
2003; J. Korczynska, M. Duszczyk, Zapotrzebowanie na prace cudzoziemcow w Polsce: proba analizy I 
wnioskow dla polityki migracyjnej, [Demand for foreign labour in Poland: Attempt at analysis and conclusions for 
migration policy], IPA Warsaw 2005. 
67 Polska droga do Schengen, Opinie ekspertów (Polish Road to Schengen: Expert Opinions), IPA, Warsaw 2001. 
68 See in particular: K. Iglicka, R. Rybicki, Schengen: Consequences for National Migration Policy, IPA Warsaw 
2002 [http://www.ips.org.pl/docs/pm/eng/polska/rep1pol.pdf]; ed. P. Kazmierkiewicz, Turning Threats into 
Opportunities: Impact of the Expansion of Schengen Acquis on the New Borderlands, IPA Warsaw 2003. 
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The Stefan Batory Foundation’s (www.batory.org.pl) European Programme initiated a 
number of debates on various policies of the EU, including the Neighbourhood Policy by 
organising conferences and releasing a series of policy papers, such as On Europe’s Future.  
Two reports in the series dealt with the issues posed by the EU’s eastern borders, and Union 
visa and migration policies.69  Between 2002 and 2004, the Foundation commissioned and 
oversaw two programs of monitoring the openness of Polish eastern borders and 
accessibility of visa procedures at Polish consulates in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.  
Currently, the Batory Foundation’s International Cooperation Programme is planning a 
follow-up study on the visa policies and practices of four EU Member States selected third 
countries, including Moldova. 
 
Institute of Labour and Welfare (IPiSS) (www.ipiss.com.pl) investigates the labour market 
in Poland.  Its participation in the political debate takes the form of mostly scientific-research 
contributions.  The Institute issues the journal “Polityka Społeczna” (Social Policy), one issue 
has developed into a monograph on migration (”Polityka Społeczna” 2000, no. 5/6).  In it, 
aliens’ employment in Poland was reviewed in the context of surveys focused on quantitative 
aspects (stratification of the Polish labour market) (“Polityka Społeczna” 2000, no 5-6.), legal 
considerations (mainly the job situation of physicians) and illegal migrations.70  IPiSS experts 
are invited to consult various ministries and contribute to the scientific life of the academia.  
Their research-based expertise is an important source of knowledge for the Polish migration 
policy makers. 71  IPiSS holds a distinct position on the future policy of aliens’ employment in 
Poland.  It favours a greater flexibility and is opposed to the closing off of the labour market.  
The greater flexibility advocated by the IPiSS should consist of the pursuit of a selective and 
quota-based policy towards labour migrants, with the simultaneous fight against illegal 
immigration.  
 
Centre of Migration Studies (OBM ISS UW) (www.iss.uw.edu.pl/osrodki/cmr/en/) is a unit 
of the Institute of Social Studies at Warsaw University.  Established in 1993, it comprises an 
interdisciplinary team of over 20 researchers working on various aspects of migration flows.  
The publishing series of OBM ISS UW Migration Papers on the legal migrations into Poland 
has so far covered a broad scope of issues, including: 
-- statistics and analyses of migration flows in Poland,72 
-- public opinion attitudes towards immigrants and return migrants,73 
                                                 
69  Uchylone drzwi: wschodnia granica rozszerzonej unii europejskiej (The Half-open Door: the Eastern Border of 
the Enlarged European Union), Report no 2 of the On Europe’s Future series, 2001. Wspólne wyzwania – 
członkowie i kandydaci wobec przyszłej polityki migracyjnej UE (Common Challenges – the Members and the 
Candidates vis-à-vis the EU’s Future Migration Policy), report no 5 of the On Europe’s Future series, 2001. To be 
found at: www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/europejski.  
70 See also: Zajęcia zarobkowe cudzoziemców w Polsce z uwzględnieniem zatrudnienia w szarej strefie (Income-
earning Occupations by Aliens in Poland, including Jobs within the Grey Zone), 1998, unpublished.  
71 E.g. O potrzebie określenia polityki państwa w obszarze migracji (On the Need to Define the State Policy on 
Migration), 2002, Memorandum by the Forecasts Committee 2002 Plus (PAN). 
72 K. Głąbicka, E. Kępińska, P. Koryś, B. Sakson, Imigracja do Polski w świetle urzędowych statystyk (Immigration 
into Poland in the Light of Official Statistics), Working Papers, Serie Migracyjne, no 5, ISS, Warszawa 1997; 
K.Iglicka, Migration Movements from and into Poland in the Light of the East-West European Migration, Working 
Papers, Serie Migracyjne, no 33, ISS, Warszawa 2000; M. Okólski, Statystyka imigracji w Polsce. Warunki 
poprawności, ocena stanu obecnego, propozycje nowych rozwiązań (Statistics on Immigration in Poland. 
Prerequisites of Normalcy, Evaluation of the Present Situation, Proposals for New Solutions), Working Papers, 
Serie Migracyjne, no 2, ISS, Warszawa 1997; M. Okólski, Recent Trends in International Migration – Poland 
1997-2001, Working Papers, Serie Migracyjne, no 16, 19, 28, 32, 39, 43, ISS, Warszawa 1997-2001; M. Okólski, 
Poland’s Migration: Growing Diversity of Flows and People, Working Papers, Serie Migracyjne, no 29, ISS, 
Warszawa 1999. 
73 K. Heffner, T. Sołdra-Gwiżdż, Migracje powrotne na Górny Śląsk z socjologicznej perspektywy (Return 
Migrations to Upper Silesia from a Sociological Perspective), Working Papers, Serie Migracyjne, no 9, ISS, 
Warszawa 1997.K. Iglicka, E. Jaźwińska, E. Kępińska, P. Koryś, Imigranci w Polsce w świetle badania 
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-- emerging foreign labour market in Poland,74 
-- national migration policy.75 
 
Institutes of Geography and History, Polish Academy of Sciences. Department of Urban 
and Population Geography (www.igipz.pan.pl/miasto/home.htm) is located at the Institute of 
Geography and Spatial Organisation, carrying research on spatial structure of cities and its 
transformation, migration (including modelling and forecasting).76  The Institute of History, in 
turn, organises conferences on foreign migrations in the historical perspective and publishes 
yearbooks in the series Migrations and Society.77  
 
Institute of Sociology at the Jagiellonian University of Cracow (www-
is.phils.uj.edu.pl/ang/index.html) conducts research projects on emigration from Poland and 
the sociological aspects of decisions to migrate as well as on the integration of Polish 
immigrants worldwide (Kubiak, Slany and Romaniszyn).   Institute of American and Polish 
Diaspora Studies, (http://www.mzsa.uj.edu.pl/) continues the work of the research unit, 
headed by Prof. G. Babinski focusing on the Polish diaspora, ethnic groups and minorities on 
the Polish territory.  
 
Institutes of Sociology and Geography at the Nicholas Copernicus University in Toruń 
(www.soc.uni.torun.pl/; www.geo.uni.torun.pl/) undertake studies on the legal status of aliens 
in Poland, presence of foreigners in Poland in view of the alienation and “alien” social 
groups, spatial distribution of immigrants in Poland.  
 
Organisations providing assistance to foreigners 
 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
(www.unhcr.pl) operates on the basis of an agreement with the Polish government, 
concluded upon Poland's ratification of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees of 
1951 on 27 September 1991.  UNHCR was the main consultant in the work on the Aliens Act 
within the chapter relating to refugees and asylum, submitting legal comments, which were 
discussed in the parliamentary committee work. The Representative's Office supports a 
number of non-governmental initiatives (e.g. the Refugee Day, legal clinics) and monitors the 
implementation of the Geneva Convention by receiving an annual report from the President 
of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners (URiC).  Thanks to its special status, UNHCR 
holds regular meetings of non-governmental organisations, which allow the discussion of 
both operational and logistical matters as well as of a broader vision of national immigration 
policy. 
                                                                                                                                                        
sondażowego (Immigrants in Poland in the Light of an Opinion Survey), Working Papers, Serie Migracyjne, no 10, 
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K. Iglicka, Are They Fellow-Countrymen or Not? The Migration of Kazakhs of Polish Origin from Kazakhstan to 
Poland, Working Papers, Serie Migracyjne, no 11, ISS, Warszawa 1997; M. Mrozowski, Obraz imigranta na 
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74 K. Iglicka, Ethnic Division on Emerging Foreign Labour Markets in Poland during the Transition Period, Working 
Papers, Serie Migracyjne, no 35, ISS, Warszawa 2000. 
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76 P. Korcelli (ed.), Przemiany w zakresie migracji ludności jako konsekwencja przystąpienia Polski do Unii 
Europejskiej (Changes in Population Migration as a Consequence of Poland's Accession to the European Union), 
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77 Ten volumes have been published so far in the series, edited by prof. Jan Zamojski, covering issues such as 
the emergence of diasporas, political migrations, history of migration in the twentieth century, migrant women. 
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International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (www.iom.pl).  The regional IOM office 
entered into co-operation with the Polish government in mid-1990s.  It has assisted the 
voluntary return of illegal migrants.  IOM has periodically undertaken a review of candidate 
countries' progress in harmonisation of their legislation with the acquis in the field of Justice 
and Home Affairs and drafts migration-flow analyses in the region of Central Europe.78  A 
local IOM office was opened in Warsaw in 2002.  Its research section contributed to a 
comparative study of asylum and migration legislation in the candidate countries79 and to a 
review of the migratory situation in Poland on the eve of accession.80 
 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (www.hfhrpol.waw.pl) Although the Foundation’s 
main focus is human rights and firstly refugee rights, its activity has had a significant impact 
on the present state of Poland’s legislation concerning the aliens’ rights.  The Foundation 
was invited to contribute to drafting the Aliens Act and the work by the Sejm sub-committees.  
The Sejm also asked it to prepare two lengthy commentaries on the Aliens Act.  The 
Foundation experts draft appeals to NSA and to the Council on Refugees as part of the 
programme of legal assistance to foreigners.  They hold not only the mandate of the chief 
legal partner of UNHCR, but they also issue expert opinions and reports on the legal issues 
indirectly related to the aliens' residence, such as family reunification, migrant workers' rights 
or personal data protection.  
 
Caritas Poland (www.caritas.org.pl) The Caritas Bureau of National Coordinator for Migrants 
and Refugees in Lublin raises legal issues of access to asylum procedure as well as legal 
and practical questions of broad integration of various groups of foreigners in its publications.  
As a key institution that promotes a comprehensive integration of refugees, the Bureau 
points out the barriers to the recognised refugees' access to the labour market and self-
employment.  The organisation also runs seminars with Caritas Germany, whose agenda 
often encompasses wider aspects of the foreigners' position on the Polish labour market81. 
 
Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH) (www.pah.ngo.pl/) concentrates its efforts on material 
assistance to refugees and other persons in need.  It has staged several successful media 
events, which sensitise the public to the existence of forced migration (e.g. convoys to 
Chechnya) and inspire tolerance for the refugees residing in Poland (Refugee Day organised 
with UNHCR). PAH issues periodical information materials for refugees, which clarify the 
legal procedures and provide basic integration advice, useful for other foreigners as well.  
 
The Polish Red Cross (PCK) (www.pck.org.pl/) has provided day-to-day aid to foreigners as 
part of its statutory tasks since 1984.  Aside from giving the material assistance, PCK 





78 Ed. Frank Laczko, Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: 1999 Review, Vienna 1999 (updated 2002). 
79 Migration Acquis Update 2002, IOM Vienna 2003.  
80 I. Korys, Migration Trends In Selected Applicant Countries, Vol. III: Poland—Dilemmas of a Sending and 
Receiving Country, IOM 2004. [http://www.iom.int//DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/IOM_III_PL.pdf] 
81 Here are some topics of the conferences organised in association with Caritas Germany: Assistance to 
foreigners and refugees in the context of European Union expansion (Görlitz, May 2001, Berlin, December 2001); 
Analysis of the political, social and economic implications of the Schengen border for the present and future EU 
border regions with a view to a common approach to migration policy.  
Migration Policy Group
Rue Belliard 205, box 1
B-1040 Brussels
Tel. +32 2 230 5930
Fax. +32 2 280 0925
email: info@migpolgroup.com
www.migpolgroup.com
